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Law and Sexual Minority Rights: 








Few issues incite as much controversy in contemporary politics as the recognition and protection of 
the rights of sexual minorities. The dominance of heterosexuality as the only legitimate form of sexual 
orientation and the silencing of all other discourses of sexuality have traditionally legitimised 
exclusionary laws and policies which completely ignored the existence of sexual minorities and 
relegated them to a second-rate position. In Europe, the first, tentative, steps towards the formation 
of an organised lesbian and gay liberation political movement were taken in the 1970s. Nonetheless, 
in the EU context, it took this political movement almost three decades before its efforts had begun 
to come to fruition, when the EU introduced its first legally binding instrument protecting sexual 
minorities from discrimination. This and other instruments have been interpreted by the CJEU in 
rulings which give mixed signals regarding the EU judiciary’s commitment to the protection of the 
rights of persons with non-heterosexual sexualities. In fact, it is not merely the EU judiciary’s stance 
on the rights of sexual minorities that has been mixed – overall, the EU’s approach to this issue has 
been ambivalent, which reflects the pressures exerted by the Member States in this field. This is due 
to the fact that the rights of sexual minorities are a contested terrain where the struggles between 
the competing visions of ‘Europeanness’ and human rights, on the one hand, and national identity, 
morality, and tradition, on the other, take place. This chapter will have as its main aim to examine the 
reasons that lie behind the EU’s ambivalent stance on the recognition and protection of the rights of 
sexual minorities. In particular, after analysing the protection currently offered to sexual minorities 
under EU law, the chapter will consider how the EU has navigated this political minefield and will seek 
to identify the main sites of interaction between law and politics when it comes to the recognition, 




 I would like to thank Paul James Cardwell and Marie-Pierre Granger for their comments on an 
earlier draft of this article. All errors remain mine. 
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Few issues incite as much controversy in contemporary politics as the recognition and protection of 
the rights of sexual minorities.1 This is a complicated and sensitive matter which touches on issues 
relating to human rights, religion, culture, and tradition, as well as on constitutional principles such as 
equality, autonomy, and human dignity. It is no surprise, then, that views on all sides of the debate 
are overwhelmingly strong and fraught with tension. 
 
Historically, persons with non-heterosexual sexualities were considered to be subjects of non-
belonging, ‘the other’, and, thus, judged as not worthy of rights.2 The dominance of heterosexuality 
as the only legitimate form of sexual orientation and the silencing of all other discourses of sexuality 
have traditionally legitimised exclusionary laws and policies which completely ignored the existence 
of sexual minorities and relegated them to a second-rate position.  
 
In Europe, the first, tentative, steps towards the formation of an organised lesbian and gay liberation 
political movement were taken in the 1970s,3 following the Stonewall Riots in New York in 1969.4 
 
1 The term ‘sexual minorities’ should be taken here to refer to all persons who have a sexual 
orientation which is different from that of the majority population as the chapter will focus on the 
position of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) persons. For the purposes of this chapter, the term 
‘sexual minority/ies’ will, therefore, be used interchangeably with – and will be taken to be 
equivalent to – the terms ‘LGB persons’ and ‘persons with non-heterosexual sexualities’.  
2 M Grigolo, ‘Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal Subject’ (2003) 14 
European Journal of International Law 1023, 1024 
3 In Europe, ‘homophile movements’ had started been organised as early as in the 1860s, however, 
new forms of (transnational) LGB activism which contested the more cautious approach of the 
earlier movements emerged in the 1970s – P Ayoub and D Paternotte, ‘Europe and LGBT Rights: A 
Conflicted Relationship’ in M Bosia, SM McEvoy and M Rahman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Global LGBT and Sexual Diversity Politics (Oxford University Press 2019) 
4 For an account of the Stonewall Riots see D. Carter, Stonewall: The Riots that Sparked the Gay 
Revolution (St Martin’s Press, 2004). For an excellent account of the history of the gay rights 
movement in the US see L Faderman, The Gay Revolution: The Story of the Struggle (Simon and 
Schuster 2015); and for an analysis of the role that NGOs have played in the development of an 
international approach to LGBT issues see E Aylward, ‘Intergovernmental Organizations and 
Nongovernmental Organizations: The Development of an International Approach to LGBT Issues’ in 
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Nonetheless, in the EU context, it took this political movement almost three decades before its efforts 
had begun to come to fruition, when the EU introduced its first legally binding instrument protecting 
sexual minorities from discrimination.5 This and other instruments have been interpreted by the CJEU 
in rulings which give mixed signals regarding the EU judiciary’s commitment to the protection of the 
rights of persons with non-heterosexual sexualities. In fact, it is not merely the EU judiciary’s stance 
on the rights of sexual minorities that has been mixed – overall, the EU’s approach to this issue has 
been ambivalent, which reflects the pressures exerted by the Member States in this field. This is due 
to the fact that the rights of sexual minorities are a contested terrain where the struggles between 
the competing visions of ‘Europeanness’ and human rights, on the one hand, and national identity, 
morality, and tradition, on the other, take place. 
 
This chapter will have as its main aim to examine the reasons that lie behind the EU’s ambivalent 
stance on the recognition and protection of the rights of sexual minorities. In particular, after analysing 
the protection currently offered to sexual minorities under EU law, the chapter will consider how the 
EU has navigated this political minefield and will seek to identify the main sites of interaction between 
law and politics when it comes to the recognition, respect, and protection of the rights of persons with 
non-heterosexual sexualities. The chapter will focus on one sexual minority group – lesbian, gay and 
bisexual (LGB) persons – as it is the sexual minority the rights of which have, to date, concerned the 
EU institutions the most.  
2. The Rights of Sexual Minorities under EU Law  
 
As human beings, LGB persons have the same human rights as everyone else.6 Hence, they have, inter 
alia, the right to be free from torture, the right to life, the right to private and family life, the right to 
freedom of assembly and association, and the right to freedom of expression.7 At the same time, as 
members of a sexual minority, LGB persons also need specific guarantees against discrimination, if 
they are to enjoy substantive equality with everyone else. This requires the promulgation of laws that 
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, as well as the extension to sexual minorities of 
 
M Bosia, SM McEvoy and M Rahman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Global LGBT and Sexual 
Diversity Politics (Oxford University Press 2019) 
5 Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation [2000] OJ L 180/22 
6 For a discussion on whether LGB rights should be elevated to the realm of human rights see NJ 
Beger, Tensions in the struggle for sexual minority rights in Europe: Que(e)rying Political Practices 
(Manchester University Press 2004), Chapter 4 
7 Obviously, LGB persons (like all others) can rely on human rights instruments and – in the EU 
context – on the general principles of EU law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to claim 
respect for their human rights. In case a specific human right is refused to them on the basis of their 
sexual orientation they can rely on the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation in conjunction with the provision protecting the said right in order to enforce their 
rights.  
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access to numerous civil, social, and cultural rights granted (by default) to their heterosexual peers, 
such as the right to have their relationships legally recognised, and the right to found a family with a 
person of their choice and to be legally recognised jointly as the parents of a child. The question that 
will be explored in this section, therefore, is how far the EU has gone in recognising and safeguarding 
the rights of LGB persons. 
 
What is today the EU, began its life in the 1950s in the form of three economically-oriented 
Communities: the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom. The central aim of these Communities was to build a 
common market among the participating Member States and, thus, all Community policies were in 
some way related to the achievement of this economic aim.8 Hence, initially, discrimination was 
prohibited by the Community Treaties if it was such as to impede the achievement of their market-
building aims: this was judged to be the case with discrimination against nationals of – and products 
coming from – other Member States, which has always been prohibited under EU free movement 
law.9  In addition, a positively-worded provision was included in the founding Treaties, requiring equal 
pay for work of equal value between men and women – the current Article 157 TFEU – which proved 
to be the first building block of what has turned out to be one of the most successful EU policies: EU 
anti-discrimination law.10  
 
As noted in the previous section, the first steps pushing for the recognition and protection of the rights 
of sexual minorities in the EU were taken in the 1970s. This led to a politicising process that facilitated 
public awareness and the mobilisation of large political debates around this matter. However, at first, 
EU law came empty-handed for persons with non-heterosexual sexualities as, until 1999, there was 
no binding EU legal instrument which either explicitly or implicitly protected their rights.11  At the same 
time, the CJEU appeared reticent (to put it mildly) in the first two cases where claims were brought by 
LGB persons claiming that they suffered discrimination by their employer because of their sexual 
orientation. In particular, it  held that EU law did not, at the time, prohibit discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, nor did this form of discrimination amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex 
and thus was not prohibited by the EU instruments prohibiting the latter. Moreover, it was made clear 
that same-sex relationships were not equivalent to opposite-sex marriages or relationships outside 
 
8 For more on the history of the EU see L Van Middelaar, The Passage to Europe: How a Continent 
Became a Union (Yale University Press 2014) 
9 U Belavusau and K Henrard, ‘The Impact of the 2000 Equality Directives on EU Anti-Discrimination 
Law: Achievements and Pitfalls’ in U Belavusau and K Henrard (eds), EU Anti-Discrimination Law 
Beyond Gender (Hart 2018) 6-8 
10 U Belavusau and D Kochenov, ‘Federalizing Legal Opportunities for LGBT Movement in the 
Growing EU’ in K Slootmaeckers, H Touquet, and P Vermeersch (eds), The EU Enlargement and Gay 
Politics: The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Rights, Activism and Prejudice (Palgrave Macmillan 
2016) 77 
11 A Tryfonidou, ‘The Impact of the Framework Equality Directive on the Protection of LGB Persons 
and Same-Sex Couples from Discrimination under EU law’ in U Belavusau and K Henrard, EU Anti-
Discrimination Law Beyond Gender (Hart 2018) 231-232 
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marriage and, thus, the entitlements granted to persons who were in an opposite-sex marriage or 
relationship did not have to be extended to persons who were in a same-sex relationship.12  
 
Of course, the above approach should be placed within the socio-political context in which the EU was 
operating at the time. By the end of the 1990s, the main achievement of the gay and lesbian rights 
movement in Europe was the decriminalisation of adult (male) consensual same-sex acts and this, in 
most instances, was merely a result of rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), rather 
than a deliberate political choice.13 Same-sex couples could formalise their relationships in only five 
EU Member States (Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, France and Belgium), whilst same-sex marriage 
was not allowed anywhere in the world. A prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation was not included – explicitly – in any human rights instrument, whilst persons who were 
attracted to persons of the same sex were, still, viewed by the majority in most countries or even 
officially in some countries, as ‘degenerates’, ‘sexual perverts’ and ‘mentally sick’.  
 
Nonetheless, the gradual politicisation of EU anti-discrimination law from initially a tool in the process 
of creating a common market to a human rights instrument had, clearly, contributed to the protection 
of sexual minorities from discrimination under EU law.14 The foundations for this were placed in 1999, 
with the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which introduced a new legal basis – what is 
now Article 19 TFEU – to give competence to the EU to make legislation prohibiting discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.15 This 
provision – which made the EC Treaty the first international agreement to explicitly make reference 
to discrimination based on sexual orientation – is what formed the legal basis for Directive 2000/78, 
which is still in force today and prohibits discrimination on a number of grounds, including sexual 
 
12 Case C-249/96 Grant v South-West Trains EU:C:1998:63; Joined Cases C-122 and 125/99 P D and 
Sweden v Council EU:C:2001:304 
13 App 7525/76, Dudgeon v UK, Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 22 October 1981, 
[1982] 4 EHRR 149; App 10581/83, Norris v Ireland, Judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 26 October 1988 [1989] 13 EHRR 186; App 15070/89 Modinos v Cyprus, Judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 22 April 1993 [1993] 16 EHRR 485 
14 A Tryfonidou, ‘Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ in S 
Vogenauer and S Weatherill (eds), General Principles of Law: European and Comparative 
Perspectives (Hart 2017). For an article which explains the reasons why putting LGBT issues on the 
agenda at the EU has been much more successful than at the UN see J Swiebel, ‘Lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender human rights: the search for an international strategy’ (2009) 15 
Contemporary Politics 19 
15 For an analysis on the steps that led to the introduction of this provision see M Bell and L 
Waddington, ‘The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the Prospects of a Non-Discrimination 
Treaty Article’ (1996) 25 Industrial Law Journal 320; M Mos, ‘Of Gay Rights and Christmas 
Ornaments: The Political History of Sexual Orientation Non-discrimination in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam’ (2014) 52 Journal of Common Market Studies 632 
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orientation.16 The Directive, nonetheless, has a limited material scope – it only applies in the 
employment context – and for this reason there have been calls for another Directive which would 
prohibit discrimination on the same grounds, but in a broader number of areas (education, social 
protection (including healthcare and social security), social advantages, and access to goods and 
services (including housing)): this materialised in the form of a proposal for such a Directive in 2008,17 
however, the opposition of a number of Member States has meant that this still remains in a state of 
legal limbo.  
 
The interpretation of Directive 2000/78 has occupied the CJEU in the majority of its rulings involving 
claims by LGB persons and same-sex couples. In the first group of cases involving the Directive 
(Maruko, Römer, Hay),18 the Court held that in situations where a Member State has not opened 
marriage to opposite-sex couples but national legislation treats for a certain purpose (e.g. pensions) 
same-sex registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage, employers must extend – for that 
purpose – the treatment they afford to married couples to registered partners. If they do not, there is 
direct discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation contrary to the Directive. It is interesting to 
note that in this trio of cases, the Court’s approach has positively evolved, from giving, initially, a carte 
blanche to national courts to determine whether they would indeed extend the treatment afforded 
to (opposite-sex) married couples to (same-sex) registered partners, to one where the determination 
was taken away from the hands of national judges and placed in the hands of the CJEU. In the first 
two judgments (Maruko and Römer) the Court left it to the national court to assess whether for a 
specific purpose national law treated registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage, whereas in 
the last of these three judgments (Hay), the CJEU conducted the equivalence assessment itself.19 
 
While in its first judgment (Asociaţia Accept)  where Directive 2000/78 was relied on to defend an 
individual (as opposed to protecting the rights of same-sex couples) the CJEU appeared to adopt a 
much more positive approach to the protection of LGB rights, in a subsequent case involving the rights 
of same-sex couples under Directive 2000/78 (Parris), the Court seems to have backtracked a little, 
 
16 Directive 2000/78 (n 5). For an analysis of the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation under the Directive see Tryfonidou, ‘The Impact of the Framework Equality 
Directive on the Protection of LGB Persons and Same-Sex Couples from Discrimination under EU law’ 
(n 11) 
17 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment 
between Persons Irrespective of Religion or Belief, Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation’ (2008) COM 
426 final. This was accompanied by a Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions ‘Non-Discrimination and Equal Opportunities: A renewed commitment’ (2008) COM 420. 
18 Case C-267/06 Maruko EU:2008:179; Case C-147/08 Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg 
EU:C:2011:286; Case C-267/12 Hay ECLI:EU:C:2013:823 
19 For an analysis of the judgments see Tryfonidou, ‘The Impact of the Framework Equality Directive 
on the Protection of LGB Persons and Same-Sex Couples from Discrimination under EU law’ (n 11) 
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and by hiding behind the screen of the national competence ‘defence’ it avoided to dip its toes into 
the (politically) uncomfortable waters of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships.  
 
In Asociaţia Accept,20 the Court held that an action under Directive 2000/78 can be brought by an NGO 
in the absence of an identifiable claimant.21 This is a principle previously established in a case22 
involving the Race Equality Directive.23 However, its application in cases involving discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation is particularly important as it enables actions to be brought against 
homophobic employers without there being a need for LGB persons to ‘come out’ and reveal their 
sexual orientation at a time when they may not be ready or in circumstances that will make them 
suffer negative consequences such as social ostracism. This, in the words of Belavusau and Kochenov, 
revolutionises ‘perspectives for future development of non-discrimination law in Europe’ as it opens 
the way to ‘strategic litigation either by a strong and genuinely independent equality body or by an 
autonomous human rights organization’.24 Moreover, the fact that the CJEU in this case held that mere 
homophobic statements based on a hypothetical, potential, scenario, suffice for a finding of a breach 
of the Directive (which shows that there is no need for an actual incident of a discriminatory practice 
to have taken place) is important in that it demonstrates that EU law does not merely aim at protecting 
the rights of specific LGB persons ex post, after they have been breached, but, also, more broadly, to 
prevent any actions which create a homophobic climate in society.25  
 
In Parris,26 at issue was the compatibility with Directive 2000/78  of the requirement of an Irish pension 
scheme that in order for a member of that scheme to be able to designate his (same-sex or opposite-
sex) spouse or registered partner as the person entitled to receive a survivor’s pension in the event of 
the member’s death, their marriage or registered partnership should have been concluded before the 
latter turned 60. Ireland has allowed same-sex couples to enter into a registered partnership only from 
1 January 2011 and same-sex registered partnerships contracted abroad can only be recognised from 
that date; same-sex marriage was introduced in Ireland in 2015, though the facts of the case arose 
before the introduction of same-sex marriage. The contested pension scheme requirement was, 
indeed, a universal condition that was applicable to both opposite-sex and same-sex couples. 
 
20 Case C-81/12 Asociaţia Accept EU:C:2013:275 
21 Article 9(2) of the Directive gives locus standi for organisations to represent disadvantaged groups 
either on behalf or in support of the complainant, with his or her approval, in any judicial and/or 
administrative procedure provided for the enforcement of obligations under this Directive. 
22 Case C-54/07 Feryn EU:C:2008:397 
23 Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22 
24 Belavusau and Kochenov, ‘Federalizing Legal Opportunities for LGBT Movement in the Growing 
EU’ (n 10) 83 
25 For a full analysis of the judgment see U Belavusau, ‘A Penalty Card for Homophobia from EU Non-
Discrimination Law’ (2015) 21 Columbia Journal of European Law 353 
26 Case C-443/15, Parris EU:C:2016:897 
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However, the legal disability for LGB persons in Ireland to enter into a same-sex registered partnership 
until 2011 combined with the universal age condition for designating someone’s registered partner or 
spouse as the person entitled to a survivor’s pension, meant that a specific group of LGB persons (i.e. 
LGB persons born before 1951) would be disadvantaged by being unable under any circumstances to 
provide for their same-sex registered partners in case they pre-deceased them. Same-sex couples 
were under a legal disability as they could not formalise their relationship in Ireland until a specific 
date – hence, this placed them in a different position from their heterosexual peers who did not face 
a similar legal disability. By treating these two – differently situated – categories of persons in the 
same way, the contested requirement, therefore, led to discrimination against same-sex couples who 
suffered a disadvantage as a result of the fact that their legal disability was not taken into account 
when formulating the rules of the relevant pension scheme. The CJEU nonetheless dismissed the 
claim, noting that EU Member States are ‘free to provide or not to provide for marriage for persons 
of the same sex, or an alternative form of legal recognition of their relationship, and, if they do so 
provide, to lay down the date from which such a marriage or alternative form is to have effect’.27 
Hence, the Court chose to wash its hands of the matter, allowing the perpetuation of discrimination 
on the grounds of sexual orientation caused by a pension scheme when regulating the financial 
consequences ensuing from the legal recognition of relationships.28  
 
This (near-)obsession of the Court to show that it stays out of matters that touch on the legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships, was also evident more recently in the landmark Coman case, 
although, in this case the judgment yielded a positive result from the point of view of LGB rights.29 
This case did not involve Directive 2000/78 but, rather, Directive 2004/38,30 which governs the right 
of EU citizens to move and reside in the territory of a Member State other than that of their nationality. 
The 2004 Directive gives the right to EU citizens who move to be joined or accompanied in the Member 
State of destination by their close family members; the latter are defined in Article 2(2) of the Directive 
and they include the ‘spouse’ of the Union citizen. The case therefore raised the question of whether 
the term ‘spouse’ for the purposes of the Directive should be interpreted to include, also, the same-
sex spouse of an EU citizen. This issue was, in fact, discussed during the drafting of the Directive, but 
– given the sensitivity of the matter – the EU legislature had chosen not to expressly extend family 
reunification rights to same-sex spouses, leaving this sensitive decision to judicial interpretation.31  
 
 
27 Ibid, para 59 
28 For a more detailed analysis of the case see Tryfonidou, ‘Another failed opportunity for the 
effective protection of the rights of same-sex couples under EU law: Parris v Trinity College Dublin 
and Others’ (2017) 2(2) Anti-Discrimination Law Review 83 
29 Case C-673/16, Coman EU:C:2018:385. 
30 Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L 158/77 
31 K. Lenaerts, ‘Federalism and the Rule of Law’ (2011) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1338, 
1355 
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The Court, basing its conclusion purely on a functional, free-movement, argument held that Member 
States must grant family reunification rights to a Union citizen and his same-sex spouse, otherwise an 
obstacle to free movement will ensue. Accordingly, the result of the case is clearly positive, because 
it has established that married same-sex couples (at least those that have entered into a marriage in 
an EU Member State) can now be sure that they can move and reside with their same-sex spouse in 
all EU Member States and will be recognised as ‘spouses’ for the purpose of the grant of EU family 
reunification rights. Yet, this is as far as the judgment has gone. In particular, the judgment has left a 
number of important questions unanswered, whilst the Court has been at pains throughout its ruling 
to underline that it merely requires EU Member States to recognise same-sex marriages for the 
purpose of determining whether an EU citizen can claim family reunification rights when exercising EU 
free movement rights. What this implies is that for all other purposes, and especially for the purpose 
of determining whether they will introduce same-sex marriage in their territory, Member States 
remain completely free to make that determination.32 
 
Finally, it should be noted that despite the advances made in some of the Court’s rulings, especially in 
this last decade, until relatively recently there was no primary EU legislation provision which aimed to 
protect the rights of sexual minorities. Things, nonetheless, changed with the coming into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, which led to two important developments in this context. The first is that the 
Treaty of Lisbon inserted into the TFEU a new mainstreaming provision – Article 10 – which provides 
that in defining and implementing its policies and activities the Union shall aim to combat 
discrimination based on, inter alia, sexual orientation. This is hugely important since it ensures that 
the EU does not only provide reactive protection to sexual minorities once their rights have been 
violated, but it ensures that in all its activities it will take into account their rights. The second 
development is that the Treaty of Lisbon amended Article 6 TEU to provide that the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR or Charter)33 has the same legal value as the Treaties, meaning that the 
Charter is legally binding. This is important because Article 21 EUCFR provides that any discrimination 
based on, inter alia, sexual orientation shall be prohibited, in this way also reinforcing the argument 
that LGB rights are human rights.  Moreover, an equality before the law clause is found in Article 20 
EUCFR. These two provisions come as an important complement to the prohibition of sexual 
orientation discrimination laid down in Directive 2000/78. First, although Article 21 (like the Directive) 
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, Article 20 can be used by LGB persons 
as a source of a positive right to be treated equally under the law with everyone else. Second, as noted 
earlier, the Directive has a limited material scope (it applies only in the employment context), whereas 
the Charter is not limited in this way, and thus Articles 20 and 21 can be relied on in situations outside 
the employment context. Nonetheless, the scope of application of the Charter is not unlimited either 
 
32 For comments on the case see A. Tryfonidou, ‘The ECJ Recognises the Right of Same-Sex Spouses 
to Move Freely between EU Member States: The Coman Ruling’ (2019) 44 European Law Review 
662; D Kochenov and U Belavusau, ‘Same-Sex Spouses: More Free Movement, but What about 
Marriage? The Romanian State, Sodom and Gomorrah, and the Case of Coman’ (2019) 56 Common 
Market Law Review (forthcoming) 
33 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/2 (consolidated version) 
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– its Article 51 provides that it applies to all actions of the EU institutions, bodies, and agencies, and 
to Member States when they are implementing EU law.34 
 
The CJEU has had, to date, the opportunity to interpret Article 21 EUCFR in a case involving 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation only once, in the Léger case, where the French 
lifetime ban on blood donation by men who have had sex with men was contested for its compatibility 
with it.35 The Court’s judgment in the case was rather disappointing in that the Court found that such 
a blanket ban may constitute discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, however, it went 
on to note that it can be justified by the need to achieve a high level of human health protection. As 
argued elsewhere,36 such a blanket lifetime ban imposed only on a specific sexual minority (gay and 
bisexual men) is not necessary for achieving a high level of health protection – there are other, less 
restrictive, ways to achieve this aim. Accordingly, it is disappointing that in this case the Court has not 
been bold enough to state clearly that a blanket, lifetime, ban on blood donations by gay and bisexual 
men is in no circumstances justified (untlik it did, more recently, in the Coman case seen above, where 
it did conduct the justification assessment itself). The Court’s hands-off approach in this case in effect 
condoned a national measure which was based on deep-seated homophobia and on stereotypical 
misconceptions about gay and bisexual men. This is probably because it tried to avoid taking a clear 
stance on the matter, as it did not wish to be seen as interfering in a matter which is sensitive from 
the point of view of the Member States, given that the contested measure touched on matters of 
public health and sexuality, in relation to which a wide margin of appreciation is often left to the 
Member States.  
 
This section aimed to take stock of the protection offered to date to sexual minorities under EU law, 
through binding provisions and through the most important rulings of the Court. A once-politically 
invisible sexual minority, LGB persons, have now been recognised as worthy of protection in the EU, 
mainly through the enforcement of their negative right to be free from discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, which has been enshrined in primary and secondary EU legislation in the last 
couple of decades. Nonetheless, important gaps in (legislative) protection still remain – these being, 
mainly, that the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation laid down by 
Directive 2000/78 is confined to the context of employment, and the same prohibition laid down by 
the EUCFR can only be relied on in situations which fall within the (ambiguously defined) scope of 
application of the EUCFR, as per its Article 51. At the same time, although there have been some 
positive CJEU rulings (such as Hay, Asociaţia Accept, and – to the extent that it has gone – Coman), 
there are still rulings (such as Parris and Léger) which demonstrate the Court’s reticence to intervene 
and to explicitly require Member States to fully protect the rights of sexual minorities.  
 
 
34 For discussion see Tryfonidou, ‘Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity’ (n 14) 
35 Case C-528/13 Léger ECLI:EU:C:2015:288 
36 A. Tryfonidou, ‘The Léger ruling as another example of the ECJ’s disappointingly reticent approach 
to the protection of the rights of LGB persons under EU law’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 91 
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It should be emphasised, nonetheless, that what the EU has provided, so far, in the legislative front 
for its LGB population is, mainly, the negative right to be free from discrimination. In other words, it 
has not legislated to (positively) extend to sexual minorities access to numerous civil, social, and 
cultural rights granted (by default) to persons who do not belong to a sexual minority. Moreover, in 
situations where the CJEU was given the opportunity to do so, it either did not take it (e.g. see Parris) 
or – if it did – it has been careful to ensure that the limits attached to its pronouncement were well-
defined (e.g. Coman).  
 
The above approach can, to a great extent, be attributable to the socio-political setting within which 
the EU and its top Court are operating. The next section will, therefore, be devoted to an examination 
of various aspects of this setting, which seem to be contributing to the EU’s approach when it is 
confronted with claims for the protection of the rights of sexual minorities: why does the EU appear, 
in some instances, unable, at best, or unwilling, at worst, to protect the rights of sexual minorities? 
3. The EU Socio-Political Setting 
 
3.1 The East/West divide and the ensuing legislative deadlock 
 
The EU boasts among its membership some of the most pioneering countries in the world for the 
protection of the rights of sexual minorities and LGB rights in particular. Denmark was the first country 
in the world to open registered partnerships to same-sex couples in 1989, whilst Netherlands – one 
of the founding EU Member States – was the first country to introduce same-sex marriage, in 2001. In 
fact, until 2004, the EU was mainly comprised of States which – at the moment – are amongst the 
most progressive in the world for the protection of LGB rights. These pre-2004 EU enlargement States 
currently not only prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation but, also, have 
extended many of the civil, social, and cultural, rights granted (by default) to persons who do not 
belong to a sexual minority, to LGB persons.37  
 
On the other hand, as a result of its three most recent – eastwards – enlargements (2004, 2007, and 
2013),38 the EU now has a much more diverse membership and includes states at both ends of the 
 
37 Of the pre-2004 EU enlargement States, all of them provide legal recognition to same-sex 
relationships, and all but two (Greece and Italy) allow same-sex couples to jointly become parents 
and to be legally recognised as such. 
38 For an analysis of the evolution of LGBT rights within the context of the EU’s enlargement policy 
see K Slootmaeckers and H.Touquet, ‘The Co-evolution of EU’s Eastern Enlargement and LGBT 
Politics: An Ever Gayer Union?’ in K Slootmaeckers, H Touquet, and P Vermeersch (eds), The EU 
Enlargement and Gay Politics: The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Rights, Activism and Prejudice 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 
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spectrum of LGB egalitarianism.39 And although all EU Member States have decriminalised same-sex 
activities, have equalised the age of consent, and – implementing Directive 2000/78 –  have 
introduced legislation prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation (at least) in the 
area of employment, there are currently six Eastern EU Member States that do not make any provision 
for the legal recognition of same-sex relationships,40 and seven which maintain a constitutional ban 
on same-sex marriage.41 In these EU Member States where social change has not yet been achieved 
and there is, still, widespread homophobia, political leaders have, often, gained political capital by 
publicly displaying homophobia and marginalising sexual minorities with calls to ‘the defence of the 
nation’.42 In addition, these Member States often have high levels of religiosity,43 and thus the actions 
and rhetoric of religious institutions act as powerful counter-mobilisers against LGB rights.44 Eastern 
EU Member States often view issues concerning sexual minorities as an imposition of ‘Western 
values’, which may clash with their norms and values which, allegedly, are more attached to tradition, 
religion, and the (nuclear) family as the foundation of society.45 
 
But how does this lack of homogeneity in the EU’s membership affect the EU’s stance on the 
protection of the rights of sexual minorities?  
 
 
39 Some have even argued that the EU’s enlargement has contributed to the concretisation of the 
East-West divide in relation to the protection of sexual minorities. See, for instance, the essays in R 
Kulpa and J Mizielinska (eds), De-centring Western Sexualities: Central and Eastern European 
Perspectives (Ashgate 2011) 
40 Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
41 Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia. For literature regarding the legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships in the EU see, inter alia, A Tryfonidou, ‘EU Free Movement Law 
and the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: The Case for Mutual Recognition’ (2015) 21 
Columbia Journal of European Law 195; D Kochenov, ‘On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of 
States: Gays and European Federalism’ (2009) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 156; S Titshaw, 
‘Same-Sex Spouses Lost in Translation? How to Interpret “Spouse” in the EU Family Migration 
Directives’ (2016) 34 Boston University International Law Journal 45   
42 RCM Mole, ‘Nationalism and Homophobia in Central and Eastern Europe’ in K Slootmaeckers, H 
Touquet, and P Vermeersch (eds), The EU Enlargement and Gay Politics: The Impact of Eastern 
Enlargement on Rights, Activism and Prejudice (Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 
43 For an article exploring the role of religion (and cultural context) in shaping attitudes towards non-
heterosexual sexual orientations see A Adamczyk and C Pitt, ‘Shaping attitudes about 
homosexuality: The role of religion and cultural context’ (2009) 38 Social Science Research 338 
44 RCM Mole, ‘Nationalism and Homophobia in Central and Eastern Europe’ (n 42) 108-109. For an 
analysis of the factors that account for different levels of legal recognition of sexual minorities across 
EU Member States see P Ayoub, ‘EU Law as an (In)Direct Source of LGB Rights across Europe’ in U 
Belavusau and K Henrard, EU Anti-Discrimination Law Beyond Gender (Hart 2018) 
45 Ayoub and Paternotte, ‘Europe and LGBT Rights’ (n 3) 
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Article 19 TFEU, which – as seen earlier – gives the EU its power to make legislation prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, requires unanimity in the Council for a proposal 
to be passed into law. Given that any legislation which seeks to advance the rights of sexual minorities 
will need to be based (either wholly or partly) on this legal basis, this means that with regards to the 
rights of sexual minorities, there is – effectively – a legislative deadlock at EU level. Taking into account 
the position of at least a handful of the EU’s current Member States towards issues involving sexual 
minorities, it is certain that at the moment the required unanimity cannot be achieved. This condemns 
to a gridlock any attempts by the EU to legislate in a way which adds to the protection offered to LGB 
persons at EU level. In fact, this may be the main reason behind the EU’s determination in recent years 
to adopt (merely) soft law measures which aim to establish a benchmark for the protection of the 
rights of LGB persons, most notably the EU Commission’s List of Actions to Advance LGBTI Equality.46  
In any event, if the general passerelle clause47 in Article 48(7) TEU is activated (as recently suggested 
by the Commission),48 this will mean that legislation based on Article 19 TFEU will only require 
qualified majority voting in the Council (meaning that a single Member State or, even, a small minority 
of Member States, will no longer be able to block a proposal). Moreover, if the option of extending 
the ordinary legislative procedure to this legal base is also chosen, this will make the European 
Parliament – the most pro-LGB institution49 – a real co-legislator with the Council when it comes to 
proposals that seek to combat discrimination. Such moves would make it more likely that legislation 
 
46 List of actions by the Commission to advance LGBTI equality (2015) available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/lgbti-actionlist-dg-just_en.pdf> accessed 25 July 2019. 
The Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality (at the time), Věra Jourová, 
presented the list of actions to advance LGBTI equality to the Council and the European Parliament 
in December 2015, which was the Commission’s response to a European Parliament Resolution and 
a joint call from Member States to step up efforts to combat discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity. The Council conclusions on LGBTI equality in June 2016 required the 
Commission to report annually on the implementation of the list of actions. 
47 This clause enables the European Council, acting by unanimity and after obtaining the consent of 
the European Parliament, to adopt a decision authorising the Council to act by a qualified majority in 
an area for which unanimity is normally required, or to adopt legislative acts with the ordinary 
legislative procedure (which makes the European Parliament a co-legislator) in areas for which the 
requirement is to use a special legislative procedure (where the Council is the sole legislator). 
48 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: ‘More 
efficient decision-making in social policy: Identification of areas for an enhanced move to qualified 
majority voting’ COM(2019) 186 final available 
<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=9351&furtherNews=yes> 
accessed 26 June 2019 
49 LM Ames, ‘Beyond Gay Paree: What Does the Enlargement of the European Union mean for Same-
Sex Partners?’ (2004) 18 Emory International Law Review 503, 525-527; M Mos, ‘Of Gay Rights and 
Christmas Ornaments’ (n 15) 636-641 
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which protects the rights of sexual minorities is adopted, including, of course, the pending proposal 
for an Equal Treatment Directive,50 which, as noted earlier, is currently blocked in the Council. 
 
Furthermore, like in all international/supranational organisations, the law-making process in the EU is 
heavily politicised, with vote trading and political games being rife. Accordingly, most pieces of 
legislation – including legislation which touches directly or indirectly on issues concerning sexual 
minorities – constitute a compromise and the result of a give and take by the Member States.51 In the 
specific context of the rights of sexual minorities, this process of vote trading often results in a 
‘dilution’ of the protection afforded to LGB persons (if any provision for such protection is, in fact, 
made!), since this is an issue that comes relatively low in the agenda of Member States. Accordingly, 
even EU Member States that have been pioneers in advancing the rights of sexual minorities in their 
territory, may not push for inclusion of provisions which safeguard the rights of sexual minorities in 
EU legislation. To do so might compromise their interests in matters which are, traditionally, higher 
up on their agenda and will, thus, have economic or political costs for them.52 
 
3.2 The Enforceability Conundrum 
 
The protection of human rights is part of the Copenhagen political criteria introduced in 1993, which 
candidate countries must satisfy in order to be allowed to join the EU. As explained by Slootmaeckers 
and Touquet, although the Copenhagen criteria do not explicitly mention LGB(T) rights,53 they have 
brought such rights within the scope of the accession process, via the requirement that the candidate 
countries are members of the Council of Europe.54 This has, in fact, proven to be an effective way for 
the EU to exert pressure on some of its current members – prior to their accession – to amend their 
laws in a way which is compliant with basic human rights obligations regarding the protection of LGB 
rights.55 In fact, as argued by other commentators, the pressure that the EU can put to aspiring 
 
50 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment 
between Persons Irrespective of Religion or Belief, Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation’ (n 17) 
51 See, for instance, the examples noted in Beger, Tensions in the struggle for sexual minority rights 
in Europe, (n 6) 23-24 
52 Such an example is the (op)position of the Dutch government towards the inclusion of sexual 
orientation in – what is now – Article 19 TFEU during the negotiations for the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
53 Note, however, that LGBT issues were for the first time in 2013 explicitly identified as a key issue 
in the context of enlargement by the Commission in its Communication ‘Enlargement Strategy and 
Main Challenges 2013-2014’ (2012) COM 700 
<http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/3cccdda3-37ee-11e3-a86c-
01aa75ed71a1.0002.04/DOC_1> accessed 12 July 2019 
54 Slootmaeckers and Touquet, ‘The Co-evolution of EU’s Eastern Enlargement and LGBT Politics’ (n 
38) 24 
55 For an analysis of the protection of LGB rights under the ECHR see P Johnson, Homosexuality and 
the European Court of Human Rights (Palgrave 2014); DA Gonzalez-Salzberg, Sexuality & 
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Member States is much more powerful than the ability it has to require them to comply with their 
membership obligations, once they become members,56 and this, often, results in double standards 
being applied, whereby candidate countries are required to abolish provisions which are 
discriminatory against sexual minorities, even though some existing EU Member States have not done 
so.57 The EU has, also, been criticised for applying double standards, when its approach towards the 
protection of sexual minorities within EU Member States is compared with its external action 
promoting the rights of sexual minorities internationally.58  
 
As seen in the previous section, there is primary and secondary EU legislation which protects sexual 
minorities from discrimination though, admittedly, there are still lots of gaps in the protection 
afforded to LGB persons and same-sex couples under EU law. National implementation of the EU’s 
anti-discrimination legislation, nonetheless, is quite problematic59 and varies greatly between 
Member States.60 Moreover, although it is clear61 that all EU legislation needs to be read in a way 
 
Transsexuality under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Queer Reading of Human Rights 
Law (Hart 2019) 
56 C O’Dwyer, ‘From Conditionality to Persuasion? Europeanization and the Rights of Sexual 
Minorities in Post-Accession Poland’ (2010) 32 European Integration 229; M Kristoffersson, B van 
Roozendaal and L Poghosyan, ‘European Integration and LGBTI Activism: Partners in Realising 
Change?’ in K. Slootmaeckers, H. Touquet, and P. Vermeersch (eds), The EU Enlargement and Gay 
Politics: The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Rights, Activism and Prejudice (Palgrave Macmillan 
2016) 54 
57 Kristoffersson, van Roozendaal and Poghosyan, ‘European Integration and LGBTI Activism’ (n 56) 
50. Cardwell has noted that CFSP Declarations – to which candidate other associated countries are 
invited to align too – have consistently required protection of minority rights as an expression of the 
EU’s values – see PJ Cardwell, ‘Values in the European Union’s Foreign Policy: An Analysis and 
Assessment of CFSP Declarations’ (2016) 21 European Foreign Affairs Review 601 
58 See, for instance, the Foreign Affairs Council’s Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment 
of All Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Persons (2013) 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137584.pdf> 
accessed 25 July 2019  
59 B Havelková, ‘Resistance to Anti-Discrimination Law in Central and Eastern Europe’ (2016) 16 
German Law Journal 627 
60 See, for instance, Motion for a European Parliament Resolution on application of Council Directive 
2000/78 of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation (2015/20116(INI)) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2016-
0225_EN.html#_part1_ref29> accessed 25 July 2019. See, also, J Tymowski, ‘The Employment 
Equality Directive: European Implementation Assessment’ (2016) European Parliamentary Research 
Service 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/536346/EPRS_STU(2016)536346_EN
.pdf> accessed 25 July 2019 
61 See, inter alia, Articles 2 TEU, 6 TEU, 21 EUCFR and 10 TFEU 
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which respects fundamental human rights, some EU Member States still insist on implementing pieces 
of EU legislation in a way which disregards the rights of sexual minorities. An obvious example is the 
right of LGB Union citizens to move between EU Member States and claim family reunification rights 
with their same-sex spouses/registered partners/partners, under Directive 2004/38.62 As seen earlier, 
this issue has recently been (partly) resolved as a result of the Coman ruling, where the Court held 
that married same-sex couples can move and be recognised as such for the purpose of the  grant of 
family reunification rights, in any EU Member State, irrespective of whether that Member State has 
opened marriage to same-sex couples in its territory. Whether all EU Member States – especially those 
that maintain a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage – will implement this ruling, remains to be 
seen.63  
 
The main difficulty in this context is that – as is the case, generally, with supranational/international 
organisations64 – there are limited possibilities for enforcing EU law and, thus, implementation of EU 
legislation at national level is mostly dependent on moral and political pressure and on the goodwill 
of the Member States themselves. When an EU Member State fails to comply with its obligations 
under EU law, a private enforcement action (before a national court) can, in most instances, be 
brought by an individual relying on direct effect. In addition – or alternatively – the Commission can 
bring an enforcement action before the CJEU under Article 258 TFEU, though – for political reasons65 
– this is unlikely to be done for issues that are politically contested, such as LGB rights. In any event, 
even when a successful (private or public enforcement) action is brought, this does not necessarily 
mean that the recalcitrant Member State will respond by bringing its legislation and/or actions in line 
with its membership obligations,66 since the Union institutions have no means of direct enforcement 
of CJEU judgments or national court judgments which find a Member State in violation of EU law.67 
Moreover, Article 7 TEU can only be used as a last resort in a political emergency such as a military 
coup, and to date the EU has not used it in situations involving politically sensitive matters such as the 
protection of the rights of sexual minorities. Accordingly, the only realistic solution may be for the EU 
institutions, individual Member States, and advocacy and minority rights groups, to resort to the 
 
62 Other EU instruments which have implications for the rights of LGB persons are Directive 2003/86 
on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L 251/12 and Directive 2011/95 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for 
the content of the protection granted [2011] OJ L 337/9 
63 A. Avetisyan and J. Teoh, ‘Together we can make the Coman judgment a reality: the freedom of 
movement of same-sex couples across the EU’ (ILGA Europe blog, 28 March 2019) 
<https://www.ilga-europe.org/blog/together-we-can-make-coman-judgment-reality> accessed 25 
July 2019 
64 R. Freedman, Failing to Protect: The UN and the Politicisation of Human Rights (Hurst and 
Company 2014) 
65 P. Craig, ‘Once Upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC Law’ (1992) 12 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 453, 454-457 
66 Ibid 456 
67 TC Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 345 
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strategy of exerting legal and political pressure on specific Member States. For instance, more 
powerful Member States may threaten with political or economic sanctions weaker Member States 
that refuse to comply with their obligations under EU law which affect the rights of sexual minorities. 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the EU has not taken big legislative steps seeking to ensure the 
protection of sexual minorities and that the CJEU has been rather reserved in its rulings involving the 
enforcement of LGB rights: being aware that there are some EU Member States that are strongly 
opposed to protecting or, even, simply respecting, the rights of sexual minorities, the EU legislature 
and the CJEU tend to take a middle position and adopt small steps which are less likely to raise the 
fervent objection of the more hard-core homophobic Member States. In this way, the EU saves face 
by imposing obligations which are more likely to be (fully or partly) implemented by all Member States, 
whilst it ensures that (small) advances in the protection of the rights of sexual minorities are not stifled 
by Member States that would oppose more significant changes.  
4. The Competence Issue 
 
It is well-known that in the post-World War II era, with the advent of globalisation and the increased 
need for international cooperation, nation states are no longer fully sovereign. Their membership of 
international organisations means that their freedom to legislate and take action is limited by their 
international obligations. This is the case, also, with EU Member States. Although they continue to be 
sovereign states, their freedom to legislate in situations where the EU does not have competence or 
in situations where it is decided – applying the principle of subsidiarity – that the said objective can 
be sufficiently achieved at national level is, still, curtailed by the legal obligations they have as EU 
Member States. Accordingly, the tendency of some Member States is to call for less interference by 
the EU and to argue that the EU’s competence and the scope of EU law is more limited than the EU 
presents it to be. This is what lies behind arguments that the EU institutions – including the CJEU – 
have led to ‘competence creep’ and that the scope of EU law has been inappropriately expanded to 
govern situations which have little – if any – connection with the EU’s objectives.68  
 
Naturally, ‘lack of competence’ arguments are likely to be used by EU Member States when they are 
objecting to legislative proposals seeking to advance the rights of sexual (or other) minorities. The 
likelihood that such arguments will be used against EU actions in situations taking forward the 
protection that the EU offers to sexual minorities is, in fact, possibly one of the factors that is taken 
into account by the EU and/or the CJEU, in instances where their approach towards protecting the 
rights of sexual minorities appears wanting. In other words, the fear of being accused of acting ultra 
vires or of over-extending the scope of EU law in situations which are unrelated to the EU’s 
competences and objectives makes the EU and its institutions – including its judiciary – doubly 
cautious in situations which involve sensitive matters such as the rights of sexual minorities. This is an 
 
68 S Weatherill, ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’ (2004) 23 Yearbook of European Law 
1; G Davies, ‘Subsidiarity: the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review 63; ADL Knook, ‘The Court, the Charter, and the vertical division of powers in the 
European Union’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 367 
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apt demonstration of the politics of the law and of the fact that law-making is not existing in a vacuum 
but is always affected by the socio-political context which prevails at the relevant time. For instance, 
it is well-known that the  EU does not have competence in the family law field but, merely, a limited 
power to adopt harmonising measures on family law with cross-border implications.69 It has, 
therefore, been left to the Member States to decide what legal recognition, if any, will be given to 
same-sex couples in their territory.70 Similarly, it is left to EU Member States to decide whether they 
will allow same-sex couples in their territory to become de facto parents and to establish a family 
under the law by being legally recognised as the joint parents of their children.71 Accordingly, it is clear 
that the EU does not have the competence to legislate on the above issues and to extend access to 
the above rights to same-sex couples. 
 
Of course, even when they act in areas that fall within their exclusive competence, Member States 
must act in a way which respects their obligations under EU law.72 This is why, although the EU does 
not have competence in relation to many issues that touch on the rights of sexual minorities, EU law 
is often invoked, the most obvious example here being the cross-border legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships in situations where EU citizens have exercised their right to free movement, as per the 
Coman scenario. In these cases, EU law does affect the rights of sexual minorities, albeit only 
incidentally, because if EU law protection is not granted, this will lead to the breach of EU law 
provisions which do not – specifically – seek to protect the rights of sexual minorities, such as the EU 
free movement provisions. This explains the Court’s anxiousness in the Coman case, to emphasise that 
the ruling is not the European Obergefell,73 which led to marriage equality in the US: Coman, merely, 
requires EU Member States not to obstruct the free movement rights that LGB Union citizens – as all 
Union citizens – enjoy under EU law. Accordingly, with Coman the EU has gone as far as it can with 
regards to the issue of marriage equality, whilst respecting the limits to its competence.  
 
Moreover, even in cases like Léger, where it made it clear that the contested national measure was, 
indeed, discriminatory against the members of a specific sexual minority, but left it to the national 
court to decide whether the measure was nonetheless justified, the CJEU may be excused for taking 
a more ‘light-touch’ approach towards justifications, possibly being aware that the recalcitrant State 
was, already, taking steps to amend the contested legislation, and, thus, to remove the discrimination 
that was challenged.74 In other words, it is quite usual in instances that require complex assessments 
 
69 Article 81(3) TFEU – such measures require the unanimous approval of the Council. 
70 This has been repeatedly noted by the ECJ in a number of its judgments – see, for instance, 
Maruko, para 59; Parris, para. 59; Coman, para. 37 
71 See A. Tryfonidou, ‘EU Free Movement Law and the Children of Rainbow Families: Children of a 
Lesser God?’ (2019) 38 Yearbook of European Law (forthcoming) 
72 Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello EU:C:2003:539, para. 25; Case C-353/06, Grunkin and Paul 
EU:C:2008:559, para 16; Case C-438/14, Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff EU:C:2016:401, para 32. 
73 Obergefell v Hodges 576 US (2015) 
74 Even prior to the delivery of the judgment, France had begun considering whether it should 
reduce the deferral period – the French legislation was amended shortly after the delivery of the 
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and policy choices for the Court to scrutinise national measures quite lightly, leaving it to national 
courts to have the final say as to whether they can be justified,75 as a wide margin of appreciation is 
left to the Member States with regards to such sensitive matters. After all, policy choices are not to 
be made by a supranational, unelected, body but, rather, they are a task for political institutions that 
have democratic legitimacy.  
 
Yet, it should be remembered that although the issues concerning LGB persons are, indeed, sensitive 
matters that require policy choices to be made which are, thus, better suited for a body with 
democratic legitimacy, at the same time, they involve the fundamental human rights of a sexual 
minority. Accordingly, although national legislatures and courts are better placed than a supranational 
court or a supranational legislature to evaluate local needs and conditions, nonetheless, in instances 
where it is clear that the fundamental human rights of a sexual minority are violated, the supranational 
institutions should be bold enough to say so.76 This is especially so given that the EU identifies and 
presents itself as an organisation founded on, inter alia, the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, equality, and respect for human rights,77 and has among its aims, to promote these values 
both internally and externally and to combat social exclusion and discrimination.78 Accordingly, it must 
make it clear that it has zero-tolerance for the violation of any of these values, even if this will in 
certain contexts displease specific Member States. 
5. Conclusion 
 
Although the EU has been quite successful in ensuring that every EU Member State prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in the employment field, the protection it affords 
to sexual minorities in other areas of their lives ranges from very limited (legal recognition of same-
sex relationships in cross-border situations) to none at all (e.g. parenting), whereby Member State 
practices designed to oppress and disrespect LGB persons are tolerated. Yet, it should be underlined 
 
CJEU judgment and gay and bisexual men in France can now donate blood if they have abstained 
from sex with other males for one year; in 2020, the legislation will again be amended to reduce the 
deferral period to four months (France24, 17 July 2019) <https://www.france24.com/en/20190717-
france-12-month-deferral-blood-donations-homosexual-gay-men-four-months> accessed 25 July 
2019 
75 This light-touch approach has been applied by the Court also when engaging in judicial review of 
EU legislation in sensitive areas – J Kokott and C Sobotta, ‘The Evolution of the Principle of 
Proportionality in EU Law – Towards an Anticipative Understanding?’ in S Vogenauer and S 
Weatherill (eds), General Principles of Law: European and Comparative Perspectives (Hart 2017) 169-
171 
76 A. Tryfonidou, ‘The Federal Implications of the Transformation of the Market Freedoms into 
Sources of Fundamental Rights for the Union Citizen’ in D Kochenov (ed), EU Citizenship and 
Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press 2017) 319-325 
77 Article 2 TEU. 
78 Article 3 TEU. Ayoub and Paternotte, ‘Europe and LGBT Rights’ (n 3) 
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that the EU’s contribution towards the protection and promotion of the rights of sexual minorities is 
not, merely, what we see on paper. The EU has increased the visibility and legitimacy of LGBT issues, 
which now form part of the European values, and has constructed a basic core of ‘minimum 
“European” standards of sexual rights’.79 Moreover, as explained by Belavusau and Kochenov, in 
matters where such minimum European standards are not available or sufficient, the EU provides an 
exit option for those who are unhappy in their home state.80 
 
It is, of course, true, that the EU’s acquis on the rights of sexual minorities is, still, rather limited. 
However, this can be explained by the socio-political context within which the EU is operating and  this 
chapter had as its aim, exactly, to place the EU’s (ambivalent) approach towards persons with non-
heterosexual sexualities within this socio-political context. First, it was seen that the lack of 
homogeneity in the current EU membership coupled with the requirement of unanimity laid down by 
the legal basis which gives power to the EU to make legislation to eradicate discrimination on, inter 
alia, the grounds of sexual orientation, means that it is difficult (if not impossible) to make further EU 
legislation advancing the rights of persons with non-heterosexual sexualities. Second, it was explained 
that homophobic EU Member States relegate LGB rights to the realm of culture and tradition and 
argue that the protection of sexual minorities is a matter which falls outside EU competence and, thus, 
the EU should stay out of it. Finally, it was seen that the EU – like all supranational/international 
organisations – has very limited opportunities for direct enforcement of its legislation. For these 
reasons, when it comes to the rights of sexual minorities, the EU legislature and the CJEU have tended 
to take a middle position and adopt small steps which are less likely to raise the fervent objection of 
the more hard-core homophobic Member States and which are more likely to be implemented at 
national level. Nonetheless, although the above position of the EU legislature and judiciary can be 
understood when placed within the socio-political context within which the EU is currently operating, 
at the same time, it should not be forgotten that since sexual minorities are comprised of human 
beings who – as such – enjoy fundamental human rights, the latter must be protected and respected 
in all instances apart from when an interference is judged to be legitimate and justified. EU law cannot 
wait for the majority to accept sexual minorities as worthy of protection but should, rather, protect 
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